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双渠道供应链协调及价值扰动
周伟刚,高成修,冯倩倩
1. 襄樊学院数学与计算机科学学院,湖北襄樊,441053
2. 武汉大学数学与统计学院,湖北武汉,430072
摘要:
本文研究了消费者选择行为给出的需求模型下双渠道供应链的协调与价值扰动问题.利用Stackelberg博弈对系统建模及其应急管理方法考虑价值扰动问题,获得了扰动前的Stackelberg博弈系统的均衡解和中心决策系统的最优解对价值扰动具有一定的橹棒性的结果,推广了供应链中的应急管理研究结果.
关键词:  供应链管理  消费者行为  应急管理  价值扰动
DOI:
分类号:O224
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目
COORDINATION AND VALUE DISRUPTION IN A DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN
ZHOU Wei-gang,GAO Cheng-xiu,FENG Qian-qian
ZHOU Wei-gang1,GAO Cheng-xiu2,FENG Qian-qian1(1.School of Mathematics and Computer Science,Xiangfan University,Xiangfan 441053,China)(2.School of Mathematics and Statistics,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
Abstract:
This article studies coordination and value-disruption problems in a dual-channel supply chain with demand model given by consumer behavior.We use Stackelberg game to model the system and use disruption management method to investigate the value-disruption problem.It is obtained that the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg system without disruption and the optimal solution of the centralized system without disruption are robust to the value disruption to some extent,which extends the results on supply c...
Key words:  supply chain management  consumer behavior  disruption management  value disruption